After the global financial crisis, several central banks introduced unconventional monetary policies, such as quantitative easing (QE). If QE increases asset prices, but does not boost the real economy to the same extent, the relationship between credit spreads and employment growth will weaken. This study investigates this issue for the U.S. in a moving-windows framework. Our results suggest that the link between credit spreads and employment growth is lower during bubbles and recessions. We also find that the relationship weakened after the Fed introduced QE.
I. Introduction
The starting point of our paper is the view that movements in credit spreads contain important signals regarding the evolution of the real economy and risks to the economic outlook, 'a view supported by the insights from the large literature on the predictive content of credit spreads for economic activity' Zakrajšek 2012, 1692) . Especially a specific type of credit spread index that is composed of individual bond prices is found to have very good predictive power for real variables (Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajšek 2009; Gilchrist and Zakrajšek 2012; Faust et al. 2013) . We provide an updated credit spread index following the method introduced in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) and examine its relationship with 3-month-ahead future employment growth. We analyse whether there is time-variation in the strength of the relationship between credit spreads and employment growth. This in itself is interesting to better understand the predictive power of credit spreads for future economic developments. However, we also argue that it may shed some light on unintended consequences of quantitative easing (QE).
Since the global financial crisis central banks in several advanced economies have introduced largescale asset purchases (LSAPs), also referred to as QE.
By now, an extensive literature has examined the impact of QE (see De Haan and Sturm 2018; Blinder et al. 2017; Borio and Zabai 2016 ; for further discussion). At the same time, worries have been raised about the unintended consequences of QE and other unconventional monetary policies. For instance, there is substantial evidence that the lowfor-long policies of central banks have stimulated risk taking (see DellʼAriccia, Laeven, and Marquez (2014) and references cited therein). According to Rajan (2013) , this reach for yield is precisely one of the intended consequences of unconventional monetary policy. The hope is that as the price of risk is reduced, corporations faced with a lower cost of capital will have greater incentive to make real investments, thereby creating jobs and enhancing growth. There are two ways these calculations can go wrong. First, financial risk taking may stay just that, without translating into real investment. For instance, the price of junk debt or homes may be bid up unduly, increasing the risk of a crash, without new capital goods being bought or homes being built. This is especially likely if key supports to investment such as a functioning and well capitalized banking system, or policy certainty, are missing. Second, and probably a lesser worry, accommodative policies may reduce the cost of capital for firms so much that they prefer labor-saving Supplemental data for this article can be accessed here.
CONTACT Jakob de Haan jakob. de.haan@rug.nl capital investment to hiring labor. The falling share of labor in recent years is consistent with a low cost of capital, though there are other explanations. Excessive labor-saving capital investment may defeat the very purpose of unconventional policies, that is, greater employment. The implication of this analysis is that financial market developments are out of sync with real economic developments, such as employment growth. It is exemplary that financial asset values have risen strongly, while investment and credit supply have shown limited growth. We investigate whether the Fed's QE has weakened the relationship between credit spreads and employment growth. We focus on the U.S., as the Federal Reserve was among the first central banks in advanced economies to introduce LSAPs so that we have a sufficiently large number of observations available to estimate a meaningful model. The main contributions of this study are that it explores the time-variation of the relationship between credit spreads and employment growth, that it examines the influences of multiple factors on this relationship, and that it indicates an unintended consequence of QE by testing the effect of QE on the time-varying relationship between credit spreads and employment growth.
We proceed as follows. First, we replicate and extend the credit spread index constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) to 2016. Price information of over 5000 individual bonds of U.S. nonfinancial companies has been collected to calculate this index. Second, we examine the relationship between this index and 3-month-ahead future employment growth. We use a moving-window approach in which the estimations are carried out repeatedly; windows of various widths (12, 24, 36 or 48 months) are used. The R 2 of the regression model is used as indicator of the strength of the link. This process generates a sequence of R 2 's from January 1973 to April 2016, showing the variation over time of the strength of the link between credit spreads and future employment growth during the past 40 years. Third, simple regression analysis is employed to explore changes in the relationship between credit spreads and future employment growth. Our results suggest that the relationship between credit spreads and future employment growth is lower during bubbles and recessions. We also find indications that the link weakened after the introduction of QE.
The article is structured as follows. Section II briefly reviews the literature about the predictive power of financial variables for developments in the real sector. Section III presents our credit spread index following the method of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) . Section IV examines the strength of the relationship between credit spreads and future employment growth in a moving-window framework. Section V offers a model explaining the variation in the strength of the link between the credit spread index and employment growth generated in Section IV. Section VI compares the strength of the link between our index and employment growth before and after the introduction of QE. Section VII concludes.
II. Literature review
Several studies have examined the predictive power of financial variables for future real economic variables, such as output and inflation. Stock and Watson (2003) provide a comprehensive review of this literature.
According to the discounted future earnings model, stock prices reflect future earnings of individual firms. Likewise, consumption-based asset pricing models emphasize the theoretical link between asset returns and economic fundamentals, such as consumption growth. However, most empirical studies suggest that the link between stock prices and future activities is weak. Fama (1981) and Harvey (1989) report that the predictive power of stock prices for output is rather low in bivariate regressions. Stock and Watson (1989; 1999) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998) try linear and probit models but do not find a significant improvement in the predictive power of stock prices. Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) attempt to predict inflation with stock prices but do not find strong evidence for the predictive power of the latter. 1 Short-term interest rates have also been used to predict future output and inflation. Sims (1980) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992) report that interest rates are a better predictor for output than monetary aggregates. However, most studies find that once spreads, such as term spreads and default spreads, are included the marginal predictive content of interest rates usually becomes insignificant (see, for instance, Stock and Watson 2003) . Several studies report that an inverted yield curve usually signals a recession. For instance, Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) find that in both binary and probit models term spreads have a large in-sample predictive power for output. However, later studies report less support for the predictive power of term spreads. Haubrich and Dombrosky (1996) and Dotsey (1998) , for instance, find that term spreads lose their predictive power after 1985 in linear models. But other studies using binary models are able to successfully predict the 1990 recession ex post (see, for instance, Estrella and Mishkin 1998) . Bernanke (1983) finds that 'Baa-Treasury' spreads predict industrial production growth during the interwar period. Stock and Watson (1989) and Friedman and Kuttner (1992) use the 'paper-bill' spread to predict output growth and report good results. However, also the predictive power of default spreads seems not to be stable over time. Bernanke (1990) predicts output using the paper-bill spread for two sub-samples and finds that the predictive content weakened during the 1980s. This finding has been confirmed by other studies (cf. Hafer and Kutan 1992; Emery 1996) .
Some more recent studies report that credit spreads constructed using micro-level bond price information have significant predictive power for real economic variables. 2 Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajšek (2009) use price information of over 5000 individual U.S. non-financial corporate bonds, sorted into five groups using expected default risk, to construct five indices of credit spreads. They use these credit spreads to predict 3-month-ahead and 12-month-ahead industrial production and employment in a bivariate VAR model over the 1990-2008 period. Their results suggest that the inclusion of such credit spreads significantly improved the predictive power of the model. Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) also construct a 'high-information-content' credit spread index using U.S. micro-level bond price data, but instead of sorting individual bonds into different groups based on their default risks, the authors calculate a credit spread for each individual bond by subtracting the yield of a synthetic risk-free bond from the yield of the bond, and combine all these individual spreads into one credit spread index. Next, they use this index to predict future real economic variables such as industrial production and U.S. non-farm payroll employment, and find a high marginal predictive power of the credit spread index. Gilchrist and Mojon (2014) report similar results for several countries in the euro area. In addition, Faust et al. (2013) who forecast real-time economic activities using a Bayesian model-averaging (BMA) approach, conclude that compared with an autoregressive benchmark the predictive content of the BMA approach is significantly better and that this is mostly due to the inclusion of credit spreads.
III. Extending the G&Z credit spread index
We construct a high-information-content credit spread index following the method introduced in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) , G&Z from now on, and extend this credit spread index up to 2016.
The 'credit spread' is the difference between the rates of return of two investments, usually a risky bond and a risk-free bond. This credit spread is the compensation for the riskiness of the bond. In practice, however, simply deducting the risk-free Treasury yields from corporate bond yields will bring about a 'duration mismatch' problem. Since the term to maturity of a Treasury bond does not always match with that of a corporate bond, the premium of the corporate bond yield over the riskfree Treasury yield is also influenced by the term-tomaturity difference between the two bonds. G&Z solve this problem by calculating for each corporate bond a synthetic risk-free security that mimics the cash flows of the corresponding corporate bond. Then, since the synthetic security is designed to be 'risk-free', its price should be calculated by discounting the cash flows with risk-free zero-cwn in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek 2012):
Here, P f it ½k is the price at time t of the synthetic risk-free security corresponding to corporate bond k issued by firm i. {C(s): s = 1,2,. . .,S} is the sequence of cash flows of bond k, and thus of the synthetic security as well. D f ðtÞ is the discount factor for the cash flow at time t, with r f t being the risk-free zerocoupon Treasury yield over period t, obtained from the U.S. Treasury yield curve of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) . Out of P f t ½k the yield to maturity y f t ½k is calculated; this is the risk-free yield of a synthetic Treasury security, whose duration matches with the corresponding corporate bond.
The G&Z credit spread is then the difference between the yield of the corporate bond and the yield of the matching synthetic risk-free security:
where y it ½k is the yield to maturity of the corporate bond.
Price information of 5659 outstanding U.S. nonfinancial corporate bonds has been collected from Datastream. Following the method described above, the credit spread for each of these bonds has been calculated. However, not all the credit spreads have been used in the construction of the final credit spread index. Following Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) , we apply the following criteria to eliminate extreme observations. First, observations beyond the range of 5-3500 basis points are eliminated. Second, bonds with an issued value of smaller than $1 million are dropped from the sample as well. Finally, the remaining terms to maturity are limited between 1 year and 30 years. 3 After cleaning the data, 4737 out of the 5659 bonds remain. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these remaining bonds. Most firms only have a small number of bond issues, but some have many more. Our sample distribution is more skewed than the sample of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) , with the largest firm having as many as 358 bonds issued. In addition, the mean values are much higher than those in the sample of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) , while the minimum and median values of issue are similar.
Next, the credit spreads calculated from individual bond prices are combined into a G&Z type credit spread index following the formula:
N t is the number of observations of bonds at time t. Figure 1 compares our credit spread index with the index of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) . Our index starts in January 1990 and runs to April 2016, while Gilchrist and Zakrajšek's credit spread index runs to September 2010. It can be seen that between January 1990 and September 2010, both indices have similar shapes, although the peaks in our index are usually much lower. These lower peaks reflect that our sample only includes bonds that are still outstanding by April 2016. As a result, bonds issued by firms which failed during the global financial crisis are automatically filtered out of our sample. Therefore, firms in our sample are generally less risky, and thus the credit spreads of the bonds issued by these firms are relatively lower.
Section IV will show that our index generally does an equally good job as the Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) index in explaining future employment growth. A simple ordinary least squares model is adopted to estimate the link between the credit spread index and future employment growth:
Here, GZ t is our G&Z type credit spread index and Ñ h EMP tþh is the annualized growth rate of U.S. employment between month t and t þ h:
Like in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) , h ¼ 3.
Following previous studies (Stock and Watson 2003; Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajšek 2009; Zakrajšek 2012), the R 2 of this regression model is used to measure the strength of the link between the credit spread index and future employment growth. A moving-window approach is adopted in order to generate a sequence of R 2 's depicting the strength of the link between the credit spread index and future employment growth for every month so that we can analyse the variation in the strength of this link over time. For instance, for month t in the sample, the regression model is estimated over a window period (t À w 2 , t þ w 2 ), with w (which can be 12, 24, 36 or 48 months) being the width of the window. The R 2 is estimated and is assigned to month t, representing the strength of the credit spread-employment link around month t. The window then moves from month t to month t þ 1, and the same procedure is carried out once again over the window period (t þ 1 À w 2 , t þ 1 þ w 2 ). As the w-month wide window moves over every month from month 1 to month T À h, a sequence of R 2 can be generated over the period ( w 2 , T À h À w 2 ). The time period considered is January 1973 to April 2016. We generate the G&Z type credit spread index from January 1990 and extend it to April 2016 using our own data, and we use the credit spread index constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) for the period from January 1973 to December 1989. We decide to combine two indices from different sources because, due to the lack of accessibility to data before January 1990, we cannot extend our spread index backward to earlier years. 5 In a robustness check, we examine whether combining both credit spreads affects our main conclusions (it does not).
In order to connect the Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) index with our index, we proceed as follows. First, the monthly growth rates of the Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) credit spreads from January 1973 to January 1990 is calculated. Then, the credit spreads for the months between January 1973 and December 1989 is backwardly projected using our credit spread for January 1990 and these growth rates. For example, using our January 1990 credit spread and the growth rate of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek's credit spread of December 1989, the credit spread for December 1989 can be calculated, etc. Figure 2 shows our G&Z type credit spread index and the 3-month-ahead employment growth (Ñ 3 EMP tþ3 ). The figure shows that generally the spread index rises when 3-month-ahead employment growth decreases, while it drops when employment growth increases, suggesting that the credit spread is related to future developments in the real economy.
Using bonds with longer remaining term to maturity
As mentioned in Section III, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) impose a restriction that only bonds with remaining terms to maturity between 1 year and 30 years can enter their sample. We use bonds with longer remaining terms to maturity, because the G&Z spread indexes composed of relatively longerterm bonds contain higher information content of employment growth. Figure 3 plots R 2 sequences estimated from credit spread indexes for different remaining terms to maturity. The dark blue line shows the index using the 1-30 years requirement suggested by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) . It can be seen that most other lines (with longer-term bonds) show higher information content for most of the period after 2007. 6 We therefore chose the 10-to-30-year requirement. 2452 bonds survive this requirement and are ultimately used to 3-month-a head employment growth expectation G&Z type credit spread index Figure 2 . Ñ 3 EMP tþ3 and G&Z credit spread index. 5 Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) rely on the Lehman/Warga database for bond price information of earlier years. The Lehman/Warga database, however, is no longer accessible through the internet. Bond prices before 1990 provided by Datastream are also relatively rare. 6 In contrast, the differences are small for the earlier years. Since the bonds collected for this study are only those still outstanding by April 2016, the G&Z index for early years is automatically constructed using long-term bonds.
compose the credit spread index used in this study. These bonds are listed in the online Appendix. Although we construct the G&Z spread index using different data than Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) and apply a different term-to-maturity requirement, the strength of the link between our index and future employment growth is generally not worse than the link between the Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) index and future employment growth. Figure 4 plots two R 2 sequences generated using our index and the Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) index, respectively. It is clear that our index almost always yields R 2 's which are not lower than those generated using the Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) index. In particular, the R 2 's generated using our index are especially high between late 1991 and early 1994. This period coincides with the peak that appears in our index but not in the Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) index, suggesting that our index better captures 3-month-ahead employment growth in the early 1990s. 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Term-to-maturity 1 year to 30 years Term-to-maturity 10 to 30 years Term-to-maturity over 10 years Term-to-maturity over 20 years Term-to-maturity over 30 years 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Predictive power using Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) The strength of the relationship between credit spreads and future employment growth Figures 5 and 6 display the R 2 sequences that represent the strength of the relationship between credit spreads and future employment growth from January 1973 to April 2016, generated with different widths of the moving window. Recession and bubble periods are also marked. The recessions are taken from the NBER and the bubble periods are determined following ; Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011) and Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015) . 7 The descriptive statistics of the R 2 sequences are summarized in Table 2 . 1974m1  1974m7  1975m1  1975m7  1976m1  1976m7  1977m1  1977m7  1978m1  1978m7  1979m1  1979m7  1980m1  1980m7  1981m1  1981m7  1982m1  1982m7  1983m1  1983m7  1984m1  1984m7  1985m1  1985m7  1986m1  1986m7  1987m1  1987m7  1988m1  1988m7  1989m1  1989m7  1990m1  1990m7  1991m1  1991m7  1992m1  1992m7  1993m1  1993m7  1994m1  1994m7  1995m1  1995m7  1996m1  1996m7  1997m1  1997m7  1998m1  1998m7  1999m1  1999m7  2000m1  2000m7  2001m1  2001m7  2002m1  2002m7  2003m1  2003m7  2004m1  2004m7  2005m1  2005m7  2006m1  2006m7  2007m1  2007m7  2008m1  2008m7  2009m1  2009m7  2010m1  2010m7  2011m1  2011m7  2012m1  2012m7  2013m1  2013m7  2014m1  2014m7  2015m1 1974m1  1974m7  1975m1  1975m7  1976m1  1976m7  1977m1  1977m7  1978m1  1978m7  1979m1  1979m7  1980m1  1980m7  1981m1  1981m7  1982m1  1982m7  1983m1  1983m7  1984m1  1984m7  1985m1  1985m7  1986m1  1986m7  1987m1  1987m7  1988m1  1988m7  1989m1  1989m7  1990m1  1990m7  1991m1  1991m7  1992m1  1992m7  1993m1  1993m7  1994m1  1994m7  1995m1  1995m7  1996m1  1996m7  1997m1  1997m7  1998m1  1998m7  1999m1  1999m7  2000m1  2000m7  2001m1  2001m7  2002m1  2002m7  2003m1  2003m7  2004m1  2004m7  2005m1  2005m7  2006m1  2006m7  2007m1  2007m7  2008m1  2008m7  2009m1  2009m7  2010m1  2010m7  2011m1  2011m7  2012m1  2012m7  2013m1  2013m7  2014m1  2014m7  2015m1  2015m7  2016m1 Bubble periods Recession Periods Predictive power (R-squared), window width = 24 months Figure 5 . Sequences of the strength of the relationship between the credit spread index and future employment growth with different window widths (1).
On average, the credit spread index can capture 32-44% of the total variance of 3-month-ahead employment growth. Considering the fact that the model is a simple bivariate OLS regression, this suggests that the G&Z type credit spreads provide much information for future employment growth. However, the strength of the link varies a lot as can be observed from Table 2 and Figures 5 and 6. All four R 2 sequences displayed in Figures 5 and 6 frequently fall to levels that are close to zero. This suggests that the relationship between the credit spread index and future employment growth is sometimes very weak. But they also frequently reach levels of over 0.8, suggesting that the link at times is very strong.
Figures 5 and 6 suggest that the relationship between the credit spread index and future employment growth generally tends to be weaker during bubble and recession periods; the R 2 tends to be 1974m1  1974m7  1975m1  1975m7  1976m1  1976m7  1977m1  1977m7  1978m1  1978m7  1979m1  1979m7  1980m1  1980m7  1981m1  1981m7  1982m1  1982m7  1983m1  1983m7  1984m1  1984m7  1985m1  1985m7  1986m1  1986m7  1987m1  1987m7  1988m1  1988m7  1989m1  1989m7  1990m1  1990m7  1991m1  1991m7  1992m1  1992m7  1993m1  1993m7  1994m1  1994m7  1995m1  1995m7  1996m1  1996m7  1997m1  1997m7  1998m1  1998m7  1999m1  1999m7  2000m1  2000m7  2001m1  2001m7  2002m1  2002m7  2003m1  2003m7  2004m1  2004m7  2005m1  2005m7  2006m1  2006m7  2007m1  2007m7  2008m1  2008m7  2009m1  2009m7  2010m1  2010m7  2011m1  2011m7  2012m1  2012m7  2013m1  2013m7  2014m1  2014m7  2015m1  2015m7  2016m1 Bubble periods Recession periods Predictive power (R-squared), window width = 48 months Figure 6 . Sequences of the strength of the relationship between the credit spread index and future employment growth with different window widths (2). especially low during bubble periods, when over-optimistic expectations drive investments in bond markets. Irrationally high demands for investment opportunities will push up bond prices and thus decrease credit spreads to a very low level. Investors care less about the bond issuers' ability to repay, so credit spreads will no longer reflect the riskiness and future profitability of investments. Similarly, pessimism during recession periods can also weaken the link between financial markets and the real economy.
V. Exploring variations in the strength of the relationship between the credit spread index and future employment growth "The strength of the relationship between credit spreads and future employment growth" has shown that the link between financial markets and the real economy is highly volatile. This is in line with the finding of previous studies that financial market indicators generally better predict future economic slowdowns than future booms. 8 Financial markets tend to be more cautious about investment opportunities during bad times than good times, and will put more efforts in investigating a firm's future profitability before investing in securities issued by this firm. Indeed, Figures 5 and 6 suggest that the relationship between the credit spread index and future employment growth is weaker during bubble and recession periods, so bubbles and recessions are obvious variables to be included in our explorative analysis. Two other factors, namely trend employment growth and economic volatility (proxied by the variability of employment growth), are also considered.
The annualized monthly U.S. employment growth is calculated according to the formula ÑEMP t ;12 Â 100ln EMP t EMP tÀ1 ;
and short-term fluctuations in the U.S. employment growth series are filtered out using the Hodrick-Prescott trend filter. The remaining trend variable of employment growth is denoted as Trend½ÑEMP t . Economic volatility at time t is measured by the absolute change in the 3-month-ahead employment growth between months t À 3 and t þ 3:
The bubble and recession periods are represented by two dummy variables. Recession periods are marked following the NBER recession indicators, and the bubble periods are determined based on Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011); and Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015) . The descriptive statistics of the four explanatory variables are summarized in Table 3 . Table 4 reports the pairwise correlations between the independent variables. Not surprisingly, the highest correlations are between Recession and employment growth trend, and between Recession and absolute change in 3-month-ahead employment growth: both of them are over 0.4. But the variance inflation factors (VIFs) reported in Table 5 show that none of the four variables has a VIF greater than 5, suggesting that multicollinearity problems do not plague the estimates of our simple models.
The regression model is formulated as The regression results are reported in Table 6 . The adjusted R 2 's of the four regression models range from 0.248 to 0.303. It can be seen that in all four cases with different moving-window widths, the coefficients on both the trend of employment growth and the absolute changes in the employment growth are statistically and economically significant. The coefficients on Recession are negative and significant in three of the four regressions, except when the moving window is set at 24 months. The coefficients on Bubble are significantly negative when the moving window is narrow (12 or 24 months wide), but are insignificant when the moving window is wide (36 or 48 months) and even become positive when the window is 48 months wide.
A potential shortcoming of our analysis is that the data and methods applied to construct our credit spread index are different before and after January 1990. As explained, the index before 1990 is taken from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) and the index after 1990 is calculated using different bonds and a stricter requirement on remaining terms to maturity than used by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) . In order to check whether the difference in methodology applied before and after 1990 influences our outcomes, we estimate the same regressions as in Table 6 , but only using data after 1990.
As Table 7 shows, the goodness of fit is much better in Table 7 than in Table 6 . In most cases the coefficients in Table 7 have the same signs as those in Table 6 . However, the coefficients on Bubble, are never significant in Table 7 , and have even unexpected signs when the moving window is wide, but this finding disappears in the models presented in the next subsection.
VI. The strength of the link between the credit spread index and future employment growth before and after QE
In order to find out whether QE has had an additional effect on the strength of the link between the credit spread index and future employment growth on top of the factors analysed in Section V, we first carry out the Bai-Perron test for multiple unknown structural breaks (Bai and Perron 1998) on the residuals of the regression model introduced in the last section, to see if a structural break can be found around the time when QE was introduced. 9 We first regress the residuals on a constant The Bai-Perron test is not applied directly to the regression model in Section V, because when breaking down the entire sample into sub-samples, the two dummy variables will lead to problems of singular matrix in some sub-samples.
regressor, and then apply the Bai-Perron l + 1 versus l test with the maximum number of breaks set at five.
Since we are only interested in the possible structural break caused by QE, we zoom in on a shorter sample period from January 2000 to April 2016. The test is repeated four times for residuals estimated using R 2 sequences of different window widths. The results are reported in Table 8 .
Since the sequential and repartition methods of the Bai-Perron tests generate almost the same outcomes, we only report the breakpoints found based on the sequential method. The tests suggest two or three significant breakpoints for each of the four cases with different window widths, and the results are quite similar across the four cases. Most importantly, a significant breakpoint around the start of the Fed's second round of QE, which was announced in November 2010, is found in each case. It seems the Fed's QE policy, especially the second round of QE, has affected the strength of the link between the credit spread index and future employment growth.
To further test the significance and the direction of the effect of QE on the strength of this link, a dummy variable called QE2, is added to the regression model. QE2 is defined as 1 after November 2010, when QE2 was announced, and as 0 before that date.
The regression results are shown in Table 9 . The coefficients on QE2 are significantly negative at the 1% significance level in three of the four cases, and at the 10% level in the case of 12-month moving windows. Other variables held constant, the R 2 's indicating the strength of the link between the credit spread index and future employment are on average lowered by 0.069-0.339 since the announcement of QE2. In addition, it is worth pointing out that in Table 9 the results for the other four variables improve: the signs are consistent with our expectations and are significant (the only exception being the result for Bubble when the window width is set at 48 months). The coefficients on Bubble is always negative and mostly significant this time, and the coefficients on Recession is always significant. The R 2 's increase in all four cases.
The regression results reported in Table 9 suggest that the strength of the link between the credit spread index and future employment growth has become weaker after the introduction of quantitative easing. This finding is in line with Rajan's (2013) worry about the unintended consequences of QE.
Again, in order to check whether combining the two credit spread indexes influences our outcomes, a robustness check is carried out by estimating the same regressions as in Table 9 but only using data after 1990. Table 10 shows that consistent with the results in Table 9 , the coefficients on the QE2 dummy are significantly negative except when the dependent variable is the R 2 sequence generated with a 12-month-wide moving window. Other variables are mostly significant, except for the absolute change of employment growth, which has an unexpected sign when the moving window is set wide (36 or 48 months).
VII. Conclusion
This study examines the strength of the link between the credit spread index and future employment (Borio and Zabai 2016) . If so, the strength of the link between the credit spread index and future employment growth will be weakened due to these policies. We construct a Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) type of credit spread index. The R 2 of the regression model linking the credit spread index and future employment growth is estimated to measure the strength of the link between the two factors. A moving-window approach is adopted in order to generate a sequence of R 2 's, showing the variations in the strength of the relationship between the credit spread index and future employment growth over time.
The R 2 sequences are quite volatile. The R 2 's are sometimes close to zero, and sometimes are higher than 0.8. It can be observed that during recession or bubble periods, the strength of the link generally falls.
The Bai-Perron test for multiple unknown breaks is carried out on the residuals of our model to see if QE has had an influence on the strength of the link between the credit spread index and future employment growth. In each of the four cases with different moving-window widths a significant breakpoint is found around the time when QE2 was announced, implying that QE (and especially QE2) has indeed 'broken' the link between credit spreads and employment growth.
A dummy variable is added to the explorative regression model which marks the announcement of the second round of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve. In most cases, this dummy variable has a significantly negative coefficient. This finding is confirmed by a robustness check in which only observations after January 1990 are considered. These findings are consistent with Rajan's (2013) worry that financial risk taking encouraged by QE may not ultimately boost employment as much.
A major limitation of our study is that selecting a proper window width is rather difficult. On the one hand, to estimate informative R 2 requires that the window cannot be too narrow. On the other hand, too wide a window will involve too much irrelevant information to estimate meaningful regressions at a specific point in time. We dealt with this problem by using different window widths. And most of our findings are not highly sensitive to the choice of a particular window width.
